Social and ecological effectiveness of large marine protected areas by Ban, NC et al.
1 
 
Social and ecological effectiveness of large marine protected areas 
 
Natalie C. Bana, Tammy E. Daviesa, Stacy E. Aguilerab, Cassandra Brooksc, Michael Coxd, 
Graham Epsteine, Louisa S. Evansf, Sara M. Maxwellg, Mateja Nenadovich 
 
a School of Environmental Studies, University of Victoria, PO Box 1700 STN CSC, Victoria 
BC V8W 2Y2, Canada. 
bThe Leonard and Jayne Abess Center for Ecosystem Science and Policy, University of 
Miami, 1365 Memorial Drive, Ungar Building 230M, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA 
cStanford University, Emmett Interdisciplinary Program in Environment and Resources, 473 
Via Ortega, Y2E2 Suite 226, Stanford, CA 94305, USA 
dEnvironmental Studies Program, Dartmouth College, 6182 Steele Hall, Hanover, NH 03755, 
USA 
eEnvironmental Change and Governance Group, School of Environment, Resources and 
Sustainability, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, N2L 
3G1 Canada 
fGeography, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 
4RJ, United Kingdom 
gDepartment of Biological Sciences, Old Dominion University, 5115 Hampton Boulevard, 
Norfolk, VA 23529, USA 
hDuke University Marine Laboratory, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 
135 Duke Marine Lab Road, Beaufort, NC 28516, USA 
 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
Large marine protected areas are increasingly being established to meet global conservation 
targets and promote sustainable use of resources. Although the factors affecting the performance 
of small-scale marine protected areas are relatively well studied, there is no such body of 
knowledge for large marine protected areas. We conducted a global meta-analysis to 
systematically investigate social, ecological, and governance characteristics of successful large 
marine protected areas with respect to several social and ecological outcomes. We included all 
large (>10,000km2), implemented (>5 years of active management) marine protected areas that 
had sufficient data for analysis, for a total of twelve cases. We used the Social-Ecological 
Systems Meta-Analysis Database, and a consistent protocol for using secondary data and key 
informant interviews, to code proxies for fisheries, ecosystem health, and the wellbeing of user 
groups (mainly fishers). We tested four sets of hypotheses derived from the literature on small-
scale marine protected areas and common-pool resources: (i) the attributes of species and 
ecosystems to be managed in the marine protected area, (ii) adherence to principles for designing 
small-scale marine protected areas, (iii) adherence to the design principles for common-pool 
resource management, and (iv) stakeholder participation. We found varying levels of support for 
these hypotheses. Improved fisheries were associated with older marine protected areas, and 
higher levels of enforcement. Declining fisheries were associated with several ecological and 
economic factors, including low productivity, high mobility, and high market value. High levels 
of participation were correlated with improvements in wellbeing and ecosystem health trends. 
Overall, this study constitutes an important first step in identifying factors affecting social 
wellbeing and ecological performance of large marine protected areas. 
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1. Introduction 
Global concerns about declines in marine biodiversity (Cheung et al. 2009) have led to 
increasing commitments to establish marine protected areas (MPAs) (Convention on Biological 
Diversity 2010). Marine protected areas – “a clearly defined geographical space, recognised, 
dedicated and managed, through legal or other effective means, to achieve the long-term 
conservation of nature with associated ecosystem services and cultural values” (Day et al. 2012) 
– have been used as a resource and biodiversity conservation tool for centuries (Johannes 2002). 
Although most MPAs are relatively small in size (median size 3.3km2; Boonzaier and Pauly 
2016), recent years have seen an increase in the designation of very large MPAs (Boonzaier and 
Pauly 2016). 
 
Large MPAs (LMPAs, also referred to as large-scale MPAs), some of which exceed one million 
km2, have become a high profile marine conservation strategy that now constitute a 
disproportionate proportion of the ocean’s protected area and have moved us closer to achieving 
international biodiversity targets (e.g., Aichi Target 11; Boonzaier and Pauly 2016). LMPAs 
differ from small-scale MPAs because they encompass more extensive areas, including 
biologically connected ecosystems, and a greater diversity of habitats, including pelagic and deep 
benthic areas (Wagner et al. 2013), as well as different human dimensions, that may include a 
greater number or diversity of human populations (Gruby et al. 2016). Thus, LMPAs have 
unique management requirements and challenges, including education and enforcement over vast 
areas, and management of dynamic seascapes (Maxwell et al. 2014). The primary objective of 
LMPAs is biodiversity conservation (Day et al. 2012), although they may take a variety of forms 
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(e.g., no-take, multi-use, etc.) and also have other goals, such as social and economic (Wilhelm 
et al. 2014). As yet, no study has empirically evaluated different outcomes of LMPAs. 
 
The contributions of LMPAs to biodiversity conservation are debated. Proponents argue that 
very large protected areas are essential for meeting global marine conservation targets (e.g., 
Aichi Target 11), are ecologically critical because they encompass entire ecosystems, enable 
synergistic links to adjacent ecosystems (Toonen et al. 2011; Sheppard et al. 2012), and may be 
more resilient to large-scale disturbances (McLeod et al. 2009; Toonen et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, they are thought to provide benefits to wide-ranging species, such as seabirds and 
tunas (Maxwell and Morgan 2013; Young et al. 2015). However it has also been argued that 
LMPAs may contribute more to political targets rather than biodiversity conservation (Devillers 
et al. 2015). While both of these arguments are potentially valid, there is a large and growing 
need to better understand factors influencing the effectiveness of LMPAs, particularly on the 
diverse social and ecological outcomes these areas are expected to achieve. 
 
Given the rapid increase in the number and total size of LMPAs (Boonzaier and Pauly 2016; S1), 
empirical investigations of their effectiveness are urgently needed to validate the development 
and maintenance of such areas. More specifically, understanding the social, ecological, and 
governance mechanisms that contribute to outcomes (e.g., protecting marine species, restoring 
fish stocks, minimizing conflicts among user groups) would help improve management of 
existing LMPAs and inform the establishment of others (Gruby et al. 2016). Fortunately, there is 
an abundance of research from related literatures – especially MPA design and common-pool 
resources – that can provide guidance regarding potentially influential factors. For example, 
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recent studies demonstrate the importance of the ecological and economic attributes of species 
and ecosystems being managed: systems or species that are more productive, resilient, less 
mobile, sheltered from major markets, and have lower market value are more likely to have a 
positive response to protection (Claudet et al. 2010; Collette et al. 2011a). The attributes of the 
MPA have also been shown to influence outcomes: a recent study found that MPAs that include 
no-take areas, are well-enforced, old (>10 years), large (>100km2), and isolated are more likely 
to be ecologically effective (i.e. as measured through higher fish biomass) (Edgar et al. 2014). In 
addition, a growing body of research and guidance on MPA design argues that MPAs or MPA 
networks that are explicitly designed to be comprehensive, adequate, and representative are more 
likely to be ecologically effective (Margules and Pressey 2000).  
 
The social and governance attributes of MPAs have also been shown to play a critical role in 
conservation outcomes. First, the literature on common pool resources provides insights on 
several institutional factors collectively known as the “institutional design principles” (Ostrom 
1990; Cox et al. 2010) that could affect the performance of MPAs. This literature suggests that 
the persistence of governance arrangements – and hence resource sustainability – is more likely 
in the presence of one or more of a number of facilitating conditions, including: clearly defined 
boundaries of the resource (e.g., the MPA, and resources within it) and the actors eligible to 
extract resources therein; the fit between rules and the attributes of the problems they are meant 
to address; monitoring of users and ecological conditions; sanctioning of rule-breakers; conflict 
resolution mechanisms; and coordination among jurisdictions for larger systems (Ostrom 1990; 
Cox et al. 2010). Second, stakeholder participation is widely considered essential for effective 
management of natural resources (Berkes 2009). In the context of MPAs and fisheries, direct and 
active involvement of fishers in the decision making process often enhances their willingness to 
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negotiate agreements and comply with the subsequent rules and regulations (McCay and Jentoft 
1996; White et al. 2002). And critically, a lack of such engagements has been identified as one of 
the key components contributing to poor performance of many MPAs throughout the world 
(Ferse et al. 2010). 
 
Our aim is to assess the social and ecological performance of LMPAs (>10,000km2). To focus 
our investigation, we identified factors demonstrated to influence outcomes at small-scales, and 
grouped them into four thematic hypotheses based on their origin in the literature: 1) Ecological 
and economic attributes of the species or ecosystem; 2) Attributes of the MPA; 3) Institutional 
design principles; and 4) Participation (S2). Our study is the first to empirically examine 
outcomes in LMPAs, and provides insights that can help guide management of current and future 
LMPAs. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Selection of cases: LMPAs were selected for analysis based upon 1) biodiversity 
conservation as a primary goal; 2) large size, defined as >10,000km2 because it encompasses 
MPAs several magnitudes larger than the median size 3.3km2 (Boonzaier and Pauly 2016); 3) 
more than five years of active management (defined as having legislation and/or management 
plans in place, and some actions to implement these); five years - to provide enough time for 
ecological and social effects of management to be evident (Halpern and Warner 2002), our cut-
off was 2014 when coding was started; and 4) enough data available to assess key outcomes. We 
selected LMPAs from MPAtlas.org (Marine Conservation Institute 2015) based on goal, size and 
age criteria, and then conducted a preliminary literature search to determine whether 
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management actions were occurring, and the level of data available. Globally, 16 MPAs met the 
first three of our criteria. Four were excluded because they either lacked active management or 
adequate data on outcomes, resulting in a final sample of 12 MPAs (Figure 1; see S1 for a 
complete list of LMPAs, including those that did not meet our criteria).  
 
Figure 1. MPA name, country of origin, date designated, and total size of large MPAs used 
in this study, (see S1 for complete list of LMPAs). 
 
2.2 Coding framework: The Social-Ecological Systems Meta-Analysis Database (SESMAD) 
(Cox 2014) was used to structure our investigation and provide a consistent approach for coding 
the 12 LMPA cases. SESMAD is structured around the social-ecological systems framework 
(Ostrom 2009b), which recognises that actor groups influence social and ecological outcomes 
through interactions between the governance systems, other actor groups, and environmental 
commons (Cox 2014). For each LMPA, we coded one or more governance system (the act or 
management plan(s) that provides the framework for management of the MPA), an actor group 
(one manager group that implements the governance system, and at least one user group 
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dependent on marine resources, typically a fisher, where such users were present), and two 
components relating to the ecological system: a proxy for ecosystem health, and a proxy for 
fished species. We refer to these proxies as “environmental commons” because they relate to the 
resource systems or units being managed. Both proxies were selected based on a) measurability: 
availability of data on condition trends over time; and b) sensitivity: ability to reflect general 
trends at the scale of the MPA (e.g., a proxy for ecosystem health was chosen based on its ability 
to reflect the overall ecosystem integrity of the MPA, such as coral cover, or a higher trophic-
level species). Interactions were structured around the environmental commons, creating two 
interactions for each MPA: one for the fished species proxy and another for the ecosystem health 
proxy. Each MPA was coded for a time period where management was relatively consistent, 
referred to as a ‘snapshot’ (e.g. major legislative changes or policy reforms would be coded as a 
separate snapshot). Thus, each interaction focussed on a specific snapshot, and included the key 
components (governance system, actor groups) that most directly interact with the selected 
environmental commons at the scale of the MPA.  
 
2.3. Coding approach: For each LMPA, we conducted a detailed literature review, including 
peer-reviewed studies, management plans, government publications, and NGO reports. LMPAs 
varied in the documentation available; we provide a summary of confidence in the data in Table 
1 (level of documentation). From the literature review, we identified the most influential or 
impactful governance system, user group, and manager for each interaction. We then added these 
key components to SESMAD (S3), with variables coded using knowledge from secondary data 
identified in the detailed literature review, as far as possible. Most variables were categorical 
(e.g., high, medium, low); the categorical nature of the data allowed us to compare across cases 
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where different metrics might be used for the same variable. We then verified the choice of 
components coded for each LMPA, and the general trends through semi-structured interviews 
with one or more key informants for each LMPA. Key informants were identified using the 
following criteria: long (>5 years) involvement in management of the LMPA, and having 
published on the LMPA. Both of these criteria were aimed at identifying key informants who 
could provide an overview of experiences and different perspectives of the LMPA, rather than 
providing a sectoral perspective. The main purpose of these interviews was to gain an 
understanding of how the LMPA was operating ‘on-the-ground’ and to sense-check findings. 
Interviews were not a primary source of data for the variables used in this study  
 
2.4 Inter-coder reliability: We used several approaches to ensure inter-coder reliability: 1) we 
developed clear descriptions of the variables being coded (S2); 2) all cases were coded by pairs 
of coders, to allow two people to gain in-depth understanding of the case, and discuss the coding 
process; 3) we held regular discussions among the research team to ensure consistent 
interpretation of variables across cases.  
 
2.5 Variables coded: We coded two key outcome variables for the snapshot being assessed in 
each case. Outcome variables were: 1) the trend in the condition of the environmental commons 
(fished species and ecosystem health proxies; options are decreased, remained the same, and 
increased); and 2) the trend in the wellbeing of the user group dependent on the fishery has 
changed; options are declined, remained the same, improved. We selected potential explanatory 
variables to test four thematic hypotheses (also referred to as “theories” by Cox et al. 2016; S2). 
We use hypotheses to refer to proposed relationships between factors and outcomes in marine 
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protected areas or common pool resources as suggested in the literature; and we refer to them as 
thematic hypotheses because we have grouped factors based on their origin in the literature.  
 
2.6 Data Analyses: All analyses were conducted using R (version 3.2.2; R Core Team 2015). To 
test for any association between our four thematic hypotheses and MPA outcomes (trends in 
fisheries, ecosystem health, and wellbeing) we used a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) 
for the categorical variables, and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) for the continuous 
variables, using the FactoMineR package (Husson et al. 2015). Both methods are conceptually 
similar; their main objective is to simplify the data by reducing the dimensionality of the dataset 
to reveal relationships (Lê et al. 2008). These methods reduce complex sets of variables into 
dimensions that comprise subsets of variables (that are correlated with one another, but relatively 
independent of other variables) to represent the variation in the data, and can be interpreted as 
representing underlying factors that lead to patterns in responses. Each of the three outcomes 
(trends in fisheries, ecosystem health, and wellbeing) were analysed with respect to the four sets 
of hypotheses. Response variables (outcomes) are included as ‘supplementary variables’ in MCA 
and PCA to assist in data interpretation (Lê et al. 2008). The variables for each hypothesis 
(predictor variables) were included as ‘active’ variables in the analysis, meaning that they 
contribute to the formation of the dimensions. The outcome of interest was included as a 
‘supplementary variable’, because these variables are not involved in the formation of 
dimensions but are overlaid onto the same space; any association between active and 
supplementary (response) variables indicates there is a strong correlation (i.e., between the 
predictor and response variables) (Husson et al. 2010). We assessed relationships in the data both 
visually using biplots with confidence ellipses for the outcomes, and analytically using the 
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dimdesc function (Husson et al. 2015) to extract all variables with a significant contribution 
(p<0.10) to the first two dimensions. This function provides the correlation coefficient, and also 
performs a test to determine if the variables and the variable categories are significant (Husson et 
al. 2010). All cases were included in the analyses as appropriate. Prior to analysis, any variables 
with no variation (i.e., all coding values were the same) were removed, and missing data were 
imputed using an iterative logarithm using the MissMDA package to prevent the results being 
disturbed by missing values (Husson and Josse 2015). We focus our results on the first two 
dimensions for each analysis because they were sufficient to explain a high proportion of the 
variance (minimum 49%; S4). We demonstrate this approach in detail for the first analysis - 
ecological and economic attributes variables and the fisheries trend outcome (see S5 and S6), 
and then summarize these for the remaining analyses (see S7 for full results). 
  
3. Results 
3.1 Thematic hypothesis 1- Ecological and economic attributes of the species or ecosystem: 
MPAs were hypothesized to be more successful if the species and ecosystems have high 
productivity, high ecological resilience and low mobility, in addition to a lower market value, 
and greater distance to market (Claudet et al. 2010; Collette et al. 2011a; Cinner et al. 2013). 
 
The fisheries trend (n=11) was correlated to the first dimension (R2 0.75; p<0.01; S5; S6). This 
dimension was characterised by the variables: fisheries productivity, economic value, and 
distance to market and explained 29% of the data variation. Overall, the first two dimensions 
explained a total of 50% of the data variation. Decreasing fishery trends were correlated (p<0.01) 
with low fisheries productivity, high resource value, high mobility, and distance to markets (> 
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1000 km) (Table 3). Increasing fisheries trends were correlated (p=0.08) with intermediate 
resource value and intermediate fisheries productivity (S7). Declines in wellbeing (n=10) were 
associated with intermediate fisheries productivity, intermediate resource value (p<0.05), and 
close proximity to markets (p<0.1) (Dimension 1, 29%). No significant relationships were found 
for ecosystem health outcomes. 
 
The association between trends in fished species, low fisheries productivity, and high economic 
value is consistent with other findings (Claudet et al. 2010; Collette et al. 2011b). However, the 
relationship between market distance and fishery declines was unexpected, as many studies 
indicate that close proximity to markets leads to overexploitation (Liese et al. 2007; Cinner et al. 
2013; Table 2). However, in our study, decreased fishery trends were also associated with high 
value fisheries, including Southern bluefin tuna in the Great Australian Bight Marine Reserve, 
and Patagonian toothfish in the Heard and Macdonald Islands and Macquarie Island Marine 
Reserves. Southern bluefin tuna are a highly mobile species, and the population is not very 
productive (i.e., they are long lived and late maturing), with population estimates at 9% of the 
initial spawning stock biomass (Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
2014). Southern bluefin tuna are targeted in the Great Australian Bight where they are caught 
using purse seines and subsequently placed in ranches before being sold to Japanese markets.  
Despite their stock declines they remain the most valuable fishery in South Australia (Skirtun et 
al. 2013). Similarly, Patagonian toothfish that also have low productivity are targeted around the 
Subantarctic Heard and Macdonald Islands and Macquarie Island. Despite difficult fishing 
conditions and vast distances to market, the high value of the Patagonian toothfish means that 
fishing in these remote areas can be commercially profitable. The Patagonian toothfish stocks in 
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these areas have been exploited since the mid-1990s, and although the biomass has decreased, 
estimates suggest that they remain at healthy levels (i.e., >50% of unfished levels). 
 
The correlation between increasing fisheries trends and resources with intermediate levels of 
productivity and value is likely driven by the incentives that actors face to manage these types of 
resources (Basurto and Ostrom 2009; Ostrom 2009b). Fisheries with a sufficiently high value 
and productivity generate incentives for actors to invest in management (e.g., gear restrictions 
and/or no take zones (Basurto and Ostrom 2009; Ostrom 2009b)), but not so high as to promote 
unsustainable rates of exploitation. However, the same attributes were also correlated with a 
decline in wellbeing, reflecting a possible trade-off between effective management of fisheries 
and associated wellbeing in LMPAs. For example, within the time period we investigated, in the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, a decline in wellbeing occurred as a result of the extensive 
establishment of no-take areas (33% of the MPA) that reduced the availability of fishing grounds 
to fishers (Ban et al. 2015), but has also seen an increase in fish biomass (Emslie et al. 2015). 
 
Table 1. Summary of LMPAs included in this study, with their associated ecological and 
wellbeing trends (outcomes) for both the fishery and ecosystem health proxies. Trends were 
assessed over a stable governance time period (S3). Up arrows indicate improvements in 
wellbeing or conditions of fisheries and ecosystem health indicator, down arrows indicate 
declines, and dashes indicate that outcomes have remained stable or have mixed results. The 
coloured boxes for fishery and ecosystem health trends reflect the state of the resource, and 
broadly reflect ‘stable states’: green boxes indicate an ecosystem or species in good condition, 
orange boxes indicate potential proximity to a threshold, red boxes indicate a degraded or 
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overexploited condition. The state was not available for wellbeing. The state was not included in 
the analysis, but is noted here for information only. NA denotes not applicable, and x means no 
information available. Level of documentation was judged on a three-point scale and was based 
on the number of Google scholar results for each case (low < 1,000; medium 1,001-9,999; high 
>10,000).  
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Cenderawasih Bay National Park (Indonesia)    Low 
Central California National Marine Sanctuaries (USA)    High 
Galapagos Marine Reserve (Ecuador)    High 
Great Australian Bight Marine Park (Australia)    Medium 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (Australia)    High 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands (Australia)    Medium 
Macquarie Island Marine Reserve (Australia)    Medium 
Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument (USA)  NA  High 
Raja Ampat MPA network (Indonesia)    Medium 
Seaflower MPA (Colombia)  x  Low 
Svalbard Nature Reserves (Norway)    Medium 
Wakatobi National Park (Indonesia)    Medium 
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Table 2. Hypotheses with the associated variables and their expected impact on trends and 
wellbeing, and the corresponding support found in our study for the fisheries and 
ecosystem health interactions (for additional detail on findings please refer to Table 3) 
= evidence found,  = unexpected finding: result was either not linked to a hypothesis or 
counter-intuitive to the hypothesis.  
H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
Variable category 
Expected 
fisheries 
trend 
Evidence 
Expected 
wellbeing 
trend 
Evidence 
Expected 
ecosystem 
health trend 
Evidence 
1 
Low productivity       
High ecological resilience       
High mobility of the commons       
High market value       
Close proximity to market       
2 
High compliance and 
enforcement 
      
Older MPA       
Larger spatial extent       
Larger proportion no-take areas       
Greater isolation       
Explicit inclusion of MPA 
design criteria 
      
3 
Clear boundaries between users 
and non-users 
      
Clear resource boundaries       
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Good fit between ecological 
and social conditions 
      
Proportionality of cost and 
benefits 
      
High participation in rule-
making 
      
Self-monitoring of users       
High environmental monitoring 
by users 
      
Graduated self-sanctions       
Presence of conflict resolution 
mechanisms 
      
Some autonomy of users       
Coordination among multiple 
jurisdictions 
      
High compliance       
Some or total outsider 
exclusion 
      
4 
High participation in rule-
making 
      
High participation in MPA 
siting 
      
High participation in MPA 
zoning 
      
High participation in 
environmental monitoring 
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High participation in social 
monitoring 
      
 
 
3.2 Thematic hypothesis 2 - Attributes of the MPA: MPAs that are older, have a larger spatial 
extent, larger proportion of no-take areas, more isolation, high levels of compliance and 
enforcement (Edgar et al. 2014), in addition to explicit inclusion of MPA design criteria 
(comprehensive, adequate, representative) in MPA selection and zoning were hypothesized to 
result in more successful outcomes (Margules and Pressey 2000).  
 
The fisheries trend (n=12) was correlated with the second dimension (R2 0.73; p<0.01); which 
was characterised by the variables: age since designation, duration of current governance regime 
(snapshot), and enforcement; this dimension explained 25% of the data variation. Improved 
fisheries trends were associated with older MPAs and higher levels of compliance and 
enforcement (Table 3). No significant associations were found for other outcomes.  
 
Although our study differed from Edgar et al. (2014), which was based on an examination of 
MPAs globally (n=87) and used measures of fish biomass across sites as metrics of 
effectiveness, we also found older MPAs and higher levels of compliance and enforcement to be 
associated with positive fisheries trends. Enforcement has been discussed as crucial for achieving 
conservation goals in LMPAs, which our data supports. The age of the MPA could be important 
because it provides time for species to recover (Lester et al. 2009), for trust to develop among 
actors (Ostrom 2009a), and for management to be adapted and improved (Armitage et al. 2008). 
For instance, the adaptive management approach used to govern the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
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Park is the result of approximately 40 years of investments in conservation and opportunities for 
stakeholders to gain knowledge and experience with management and enforcement (McCook et 
al. 2010). In particular, long-term ecological monitoring and environmental research has 
provided knowledge to support the development of more effective zoning and fisheries 
management regimes for improved fisheries outcomes (Harrison et al. 2012). Similarly, in the 
central California National Marine Sanctuaries, the Gulf of the Farallones has 35 years of 
monitoring and enforcement experience that has allowed managers and scientists to improve 
planning, engage with complementary resource agencies (i.e., the National Marine Fisheries 
Service), create informed spatial plans for essential fish habitats and adaptive rockfish 
conservation areas, and to observe recovery (de Marignac et al. 2009).   
 
3.3 Thematic hypothesis 3 - social and governance attributes: the institutional design 
principles: We examined the institutional design principles from the literature on common pool 
resources (Ostrom 1990; Cox et al. 2010). We hypothesized that presence of the institutional 
design principles would lead to more successful outcomes.  
 
The fisheries trend (n=11) was correlated to the second dimension (R2 0.73; p<0.01), which 
explained 24% of the data variation. A declining fisheries trend (p=0.003) was correlated with 
moderate external recognition, intermediate levels of participation and environmental 
monitoring, and total outsider exclusion (p<0.05), no self-monitoring or sanctions, intermediate 
social-ecological fit, and proportionality of cost and benefits (p<0.1).  
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Improvements (p=0.07) and declines (p=0.08) in the wellbeing of fishery user groups (n=10) 
were correlated with the second dimension, which explained 25% of the data variability. 
Improved wellbeing was associated with the variable categories: high compliance, 
proportionality of cost and benefits, intermediate social-ecological fit (p<0.05), rigid boundaries, 
moderate external recognition, and intermediate environmental monitoring (p<0.10). A decline 
in wellbeing was associated with the variable categories: some compliance, no proportionality of 
cost and benefits, low participation, low external recognition, no outsider exclusion (p<0.05), 
low social-ecological fit, and low environmental monitoring (p<0.10).  
 
Improved ecosystem health trends (n=10) were associated with the first dimension, which 
explained 27% of the data variation, and were correlated with the variable categories: high 
environmental monitoring, high social-ecological fit, intermediate participation, moderate 
boundary negotiability, unclear user boundaries, high compliance (p<0.05), and fuzzy user 
boundaries (p<0.10; Table 3). 
 
While the presence of the institutional design principles is commonly thought to lead to 
improved trends in resource conditions, we found outsider exclusion plus the partial presence 
(intermediate or moderate values) of three of the institutional design principles to be associated 
with a declining fisheries trend. Given the theoretical mechanisms by which such principles can 
work to enable sustainable commons management, these are surprising results that warrant 
unpacking, particularly with respect to the principle of outsider exclusion. Three of the 
Australian LMPAs experienced declining fisheries yet had intermediate levels of participation in 
management and were active participants in environmental monitoring programs such as tag-
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recapture surveys. Southern bluefin tuna are fished in the Great Australian Bight Marine Park, 
but have also been intensively fished throughout their range since the 1950s and have 
experienced severe population declines (Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna 2014). In contrast, the declines in Patagonian toothfish in the Australian Sub-Antarctic 
LMPAs (Heard and Macdonald Islands, and Macquarie Island) are an intentional management 
action: relatively recently exploited stocks that are considered above Maximum Sustainable 
Yield. Outsider exclusion is postulated to be an important factor to ensure that a commons is not 
over-exploited (Ostrom 1990; Basurto and Ostrom 2009; Cox et al. 2010). However, the effects 
of exclusion might also depend upon the extent to which actors are dependent upon a particular 
stock. The same companies hold rights to fish for toothfish in both the Heard and MacDonald 
Islands and Macquarie Islands fisheries (and other areas) and as a result have lower incentives to 
lobby for conservation of any individual stock. Similarly because of the high economic value of 
the fished species (Southern bluefin tuna and Patagonian toothfish); short-term harvests might be 
rationally preferred over long-term conservation (and see thematic hypothesis 1). More 
generally, it appears that the presence of individual factors is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
success, highlighting the limitations of institutional theory when applied to complex cases. 
 
Improved wellbeing related to fisheries was associated with more equitable distribution of social 
impacts and a system where rules are adjusted to fit local conditions (e.g., proportionality of 
costs and benefits, intermediate social-ecological fit, intermediate external recognition). Where 
the benefits of managing resources are distributed in proportion to the costs that actors incur in 
managing them, actors are more likely to make long-term investments of time and resources in 
activities such as monitoring and rule-making (Cox et al. 2010); providing benefits to the group 
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as a whole. Conversely, a decline in wellbeing was linked to the absence of many of these 
conditions including a lack of proportionality of cost and benefits, low participation, and low 
external recognition: suggesting a situation where there is a lack of recognition and rights in 
LMPA governance, the rules do not necessarily reflect local conditions or needs, and the fishers 
are bearing costs of management actions (e.g., no-take zones). In the Wakatobi National Park 
(WNP), the Bajau depend almost exclusively on marine resources and fishing is central to their 
culture and society (Clifton 2013). The governance of the WNP is poorly adapted to local 
institutions and marine system dynamics (von Heland and Clifton 2014) and the Bajau have had 
limited involvement in the rules of the park and ongoing environmental monitoring. Bajau have 
been marginalised through both state and NGO initiatives in the WNP (Clifton 2013) and their 
wellbeing can be considered to have declined, with reported changes in social customs and 
perceived loss in freedom, which are elements central to their identity (C.Tam, pers comm). 
Conversely, another LMPA in Indonesia is the Raja Ampat marine network that was established 
11 years after the WNP through a bottom-up approach. This network has a higher percentage of 
no-take zones than WNP and each of the MPAs in the LMPA network are managed 
collaboratively between local communities, NGOs, and government (intermediate social-
ecological fit, and proportionality). Consequently there is high compliance, and improvements 
have been noted across a range of wellbeing indicators (Glew et al. 2015). 
 
An improved trend in ecosystem health was also linked to the factors that suggest the rules are 
appropriate for local conditions and needs, with involvement of groups with environmental 
monitoring and high compliance. This configuration is illustrated with the Central California 
National Marine Sanctuaries (CCNMS). The CCNMS maintains high levels of ecosystem health 
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(Office of National Marine Sanctuaries 2008) and has also successfully mitigated threats to 
ecosystem health in recent years (e.g., oil exploitation) (Office of National Marine Sanctuaries 
2010). Within the CCNMS there are a number of user-led long-term monitoring projects, and the 
Sanctuary Advisory Council formally incorporates stakeholder input into the management of the 
LMPA, and compliance is high. While the user boundaries are unclear, this reflects the flexibility 
and inclusivity of the rule system to incorporate any potential user, which in this instance does 
not appear to adversely affect trends in ecosystem health. 
 
3.4 Thematic hypothesis 4 – social attributes of the MPA: Participation: Participation is 
commonly linked to successful resource management in the literature on common pool 
resources. However, the design principles are limited by using a single aggregate indicator of 
participation; neglecting the multiple aspects of participation that are potentially relevant for 
LMPAs. We hypothesized that LMPAs are more successful when there is participation at all 
stages in rule-making; including MPA siting, MPA zoning, as well as environmental and social 
monitoring.  
 
The fisheries trend (n=11) was correlated to the second dimension (R2 0.59; p=0.03), 
characterised by the participation variables: rule-making, zoning, environmental monitoring, and 
siting, and explained 31% of the data variation. A declining fisheries trend (p=0.01) was 
associated with intermediate levels of participation in environmental monitoring, siting, rule-
making, and zoning (Table 3). Improvements in user wellbeing (n=10) were correlated to the 
first dimension (p=0.05), and associated with high participation in zoning, social monitoring, 
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siting, rule-making, and environmental monitoring (p<0.05; Table 3). No significant associations 
were found for other outcomes.  
 
Intermediate levels of participation in different activities were associated with declines in fished 
species, whereas high levels of participation were linked to improved wellbeing. The Raja 
Ampat Marine Network illustrates the importance of participation, as it has high levels of 
participation in all aspects, and is unique among our sample of LMPAs in that it was initiated 
and established through a collaborative effort between communities, government, and 
International NGOs. Local communities originally designated the sites through customary law 
(adat declarations), building on local marine tenure and traditional management, and they remain 
formally involved in the management of the MPAs. A variety of wellbeing indicators including 
food security and school enrollment, have been recorded as improving across the sites (Glew et 
al. 2015). By contrast, the sea cucumber fishery in Galapagos Marine Reserve has experienced 
dramatic declines, and is now considered overexploited and economically extinct (Toral-Granda 
2008). The Galapagos Marine Reserve had intermediate levels of participation because it has a 
two-tier governance framework, including the Participatory Management Board, a decision 
making body comprised of local representatives of tourism, naturalist guide, and fishing sectors, 
Galapagos National Parks Service, and (until 2008) the Charles Darwin Foundation. Although 
the creation of the Participatory Management Board was a milestone in community participation, 
the first five years were dominated by social unrest and conflict (Jones 2013). During this time, 
the Participatory Management Board established sea cucumber quotas that were based on 
political considerations rather than scientific data, which contributed to the overexploitation of 
sea cucumbers (Wolff et al. 2012). However, in more recent years, the Participatory 
24 
 
Management Board has been able to reach consensus, and the sea cucumber fishery which was 
closed for four years (it was opened in 2015), although it has not yet shown signs of recovery. 
 
Table 3. Summary of the variable categories correlated with outcomes (p<0.05) for each thematic 
hypothesis. Green text = associated with improved outcome; red text = associated with decline. 
Where no correlations to outcomes were found, the cell has been shaded grey. 
 Outcomes  
Fisheries Wellbeing Ecosystem health 
1. Ecological &  
economic attributes	  
Low productivity;  
High economic value; 
Distance to market > 1000km; 
High mobility 
Intermediate productivity; 
Intermediate economic value 
 
2. Attributes of 
MPAs 
Older;  
High enforcement 
  
3. Design 
principles 
Moderate external recognition; 
Intermediate participation; 
Intermediate environmental 
monitoring; 
Total outsider exclusion 
High compliance; 
Proportionality of cost & benefits; 
Intermediate social-ecological fit  
Some compliance; 
No proportionality of cost & benefits; 
Low participation; 
Low external recognition; 
No outsider exclusion 
High environmental 
monitoring; 
High social-ecological fit; 
Intermediate participation; 
Moderate boundary 
negotiability; 
Unclear user boundaries; 
High compliance 
4. Participation Intermediate participation in: 
siting; 
rulemaking; 
environmental monitoring 
High participation in: 
zoning;  
social monitoring; 
siting; rulemaking; environmental 
monitoring 
 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
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Marine protected areas (MPAs) remain an important tool for biodiversity conservation and there 
has been an increase in the implementation of LMPAs (Spalding et al. 2013; Boonzaier and 
Pauly 2016). Our study is the first to examine the extent to which findings from small-scale 
MPAs and common pool resource theory apply to LMPAs. We found that: (i) targeted species 
with low levels of productivity, high mobility, and high market value were related to fisheries 
decline; (ii) older MPAs with higher levels of compliance and enforcement were associated with 
improved fisheries trends; (iii) low levels of participation by resource users and limited external 
recognition were related to declines in wellbeing, whereas (iv) high participation in zoning, 
social monitoring, siting, rulemaking and environmental monitoring were associated with 
improvements in wellbeing (Table 3). 
 
There were also a number of unexpected results. For instance, we expected to observe 
improvements in fished species with an increasing distance to market, but rather found the 
opposite relationship. Similarly, the association between declining fisheries and intermediate 
levels of external recognition, participation, and high levels of outsider exclusion are somewhat 
at odds with Ostrom’s (1990) institutional design principles. We also expected intermediate or 
high (as opposed to low) levels of participation in siting, rulemaking, and environmental 
monitoring to be associated with improvements in targeted fish stocks. We assessed the thematic 
hypotheses against trends in fisheries, ecosystem health, and wellbeing, whereas many studies 
from which the theory is derived have used static outcome measures (e.g., relative biomass, 
subjective assessments of environmental conditions, state of the system, etc.). Trends provide a 
different way of thinking about effectiveness than state (e.g., has governance halted or reversed 
declining trends?). Additionally, there are many challenges to scaling up theory from the small-
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scale to large-scale systems, and indeed the applicability of the design principles to large-scale 
environmental governance has been questioned (Young 2002; Araral 2014). Although our results 
provide partial support for the design principles at the large-scale, they also reveal some of the 
limitations of institutional theory when applied to complex cases.  
 
Stakeholder participation is now synonymous with protected area design and environmental 
management more broadly for both instrumental (better outcomes) and ethical reasons (people 
should be involved in decisions that affect them) (Berkes 2009). Indeed, we found improvements 
in wellbeing associated with high participation in zoning, social monitoring, siting, rule-making, 
and environmental monitoring. At smaller scales, although many groups may have a stake in 
management decisions, it is far easier to identify who those stakeholders are and develop 
mechanisms to mitigate impacts from MPAs. Furthermore, transaction costs associated with 
participation are likely to rise precipitously at larger scales particularly for tasks such as 
enforcement and environmental monitoring. For these reasons, designing (and indeed coding) 
governance arrangements based on the autonomy and participation of resource users are 
challenging at large-scales. Many LMPAs have invested considerable effort in designing 
processes for stakeholder engagement, and yet, given the size of LMPAs, these initiatives only 
reach a subset of stakeholders. Moreover, stakeholder groups often struggle to achieve broad-
scale representation of their members in response to LMPAs because of the challenge in 
organizing and mobilizing a large group with typically diverse interests, values, and perspectives 
(Wilhelm et al. 2014). In large-scale systems it is therefore relatively rare to achieve high levels 
of citizen control or user participation in management. Importantly, our data suggest that even in 
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the absence of improving fisheries, high levels of participation and proportionality of costs and 
benefits among stakeholders contributes to improvements in the wellbeing of user groups. 
 
Our analysis of LMPAs is limited by a number of factors. First, the small number of LMPAs 
with at least 5 years of active management limits our ability to detect statistically significant 
relationships (although we note that this was the full sample of cases available; S1). Furthermore, 
where cases did not have a direct user of fishery resources (Papahānaumokuākea, which is all no-
take and far from human populations) or information available on wellbeing trends (Seaflower) 
they were excluded from certain analyses, which further eroded statistical power of some tests. 
Even though all of the LMPAs in our sample have been actively managed for at least five years, 
long-term data were not always readily available. Studies were also biased towards the 
ecological aspects of the MPA, with lower levels of documentation for social data. In addition, 
there is a known publication bias of ‘positive’ studies and it is likely that negative impacts or 
outcomes from LMPAs are under-reported due to concerns about exposing shortcomings. We 
encourage improved monitoring and reporting from LMPAs to enable cross-fertilization of 
lessons across the growing population of LMPAs, including failures and successes. Finally, 
global meta-analyses are inherently challenged by the variability of cases and different metrics 
across variables. We overcame this limitation by measuring variables with 3-point Likert scales 
and binary variables (S2), but this approach masks more nuanced information for cases where 
more detail exists. Despite these limitations, our study demonstrates a first attempt at 
investigating the applicability of hypotheses developed from small-scale systems for LMPAs that 
can be used for the design of future studies and the collection of comparable data in multiple 
LMPAs. 
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Our findings allow us to provide some general guidance for LMPA management. First, 
compliance and enforcement matters across multiple outcomes: increased trends in ecosystem 
health and fished stocks, and improved wellbeing. Thus improving compliance and enforcement 
should be a priority for managers of LMPAs, and should be considered in their design and 
implementation. Second, participation appears to influence various outcomes, with intermediate 
levels of participation being linked to declines in fished species but improvements in ecosystem 
health, and high participation being associated with improvements in wellbeing. Engaging in 
meaningful participation in all aspects of design, implementation, and management of LMPAs 
should be a priority for managers. Finally, some attributes of MPAs and species also matter, and 
thus management activities should consider the productivity, mobility, and economic value of 
targeted species. Some of these variables can be directly influenced by the design and 
management of LMPAs (e.g., compliance and enforcement, participation), whereas others (e.g., 
productivity, mobility, market value) are outside of the influence of managers. 
 
While some of our findings can lead to general recommendations, there are unlikely to be fail-
safe panaceas for creating socially and ecologically effective LMPAs. Rather, it is important to 
craft management to fit the local context (Young 2002). Our MPA cases may have had positive 
outcomes for a diversity of reasons that are tied to the diversity of the ecological environment, 
the actors, or the governance system itself. Improved monitoring and reporting of a range of 
social and ecological outcomes will aid further understanding of factors of success in LMPAs. 
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S1. Full list of designated large Marine Protected Areas (>10,000km2), ordered from 
oldest to newest. LMPAs that fulfilled our selection criteria (1: Primary goal of biodiversity 
conservation; 2: Large; 3: > 5 years active management; 4: Enough data available to assess 
key outcomes) and were included in our study are marked in bold. The rationale for LMPAs 
that appear to fit our criteria but were not used in our study has been noted. Information from 
MPAtlas.org.  
LMPA name Date designated Size (km
2) Included (Y/N) Rationale 
East Svalbard Nature Reserves 1973 52,365 Y  
Greenland National Park 1974 110,600 N Not enough data 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 1975 344,400 Y  
Dominican Republic Marine Mammal 
Sanctuary 1986 66,670 N 
Not enough 
data 
Cenderawasih Bay National Park  1990 13,852 Y  
Central California National Marine 
Sanctuaries 1992 27,645 Y  
Franz Josef Land 1994 26,000 N 
No active 
management 
of the marine 
area  
Wakatobi National Park  1996 13,395 Y  
Galapagos Marine Reserve 1998 133,000 Y  
Great Australian Bight Marine Park 1998 19,395 Y  
Macquarie Island Marine Reserve 1999 162,060 Y  
Pelagos Sanctuary 2001 87,492 N No active management 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands 2002 64,598 Y  
Seaflower MPA 2005 65,000 Y  
Papahanaumokuakea Marine 
National Monument 2006 362,073* Y  
Phoenix Islands Protected Area 2006 408,224 N 
Management 
plan 
introduced in 
2010 
Raja Ampat MPA Network 2007 11,859 Y  
LMPAs below had not had active management for five years (at time of coding) 
Marianas Trench Marine National 
Monument 2009 250,488 N 
Management 
in 
development 
Pacific Remote Islands Marine National 
Monument 2009 1,271,525 N 
Management 
in 
development 
Rose Atoll Marine National Monument 2009 34,838 N Management in 
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development 
South Orkney Islands Southern Shelf 
MPA 2010 93,818 N 
Management 
introduced in 
2013 
Chagos MPA 2010 640,000 N 
Interim 
management 
framework 
2014-15 
Charlie-Gibbs South High Seas MPA 2010 145,420 N  
Josephine Seamount High Seas MPA 2010 19,370   
Marine Park of Mayotte 2010 68,345 N  
Mid-Atlantic Ridge North of the Azores 
(MARNA) 2010 93,416 N  
Milne Seamount Complex MPA 2010 20,913 N  
Australia Commonwealth Marine 
Reserves (n=18)**  2012 1,871,668 N  
Charlie-Gibbs North High Seas MPA 2012 178,651 N  
Gloriosos Islands Marine Nature Park 2012 48,350 N  
South Georgia and South Sandwich 
Islands Marine Protected Area 2012 1,070,000 N  
Fagatale Bay National Marine Sanctuary 2012 35,174 N  
Prince Edward Islands MPA 2013 180,000 N  
Natural Park of the Coral Sea 2014 1,292,962 N  
Savu Sea (Tirosa Batek) 2014 29,454 N  
Motu Motivo Hiva Marine Park  2015 720,000 N  
Nazca Desventuradas 2015 297,000 N  
Palau National Marine Sanctuary 2015 500,000 N  
Pitcairn Islands Marine Reserve 2015 834,334 N  
Kermadec Ocean Sanctuary 2016 620,000 N  
Marae Moana Cook Islands (Cook 
Islands Marine Park) 2016 1,100,000 N  
 
* On 26th August 2016 Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument was extended to 1,508,870 
km2.  
** Australia Commonwealth Marine Reserves >10,000km2: Abrolhos; Argo-Rowley Terrace; Central 
Eastern; Coral Sea; Flinders; Freycinet; Gascoyne; Kimberly; Lord Howe; Murray; Norfolk; Oceanic 
Shoals; Shark Bay; South Tasman Rise; South-west Corner; Tasman Fracture; Western Eyre; Zeehan. 
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S2. Descriptions of the variables analysed for each thematic hypothesis. 
Thematic hypothesis 1- Ecological and economic attributes of the species or ecosystem 
Variable Question (and 
definition) 
Options 
Commons 
mobility 
What is the mobility of 
this commons? 
High: Commons is highly migratory and capable of 
regularly travelling great distances (>500 km, but often 
>5000km), and is typically considered a ‘migratory 
species’; 
Medium: Commons may be fairly site specific but 
capable of larger movements (e.g. ontogenetic 
migration), or have a relatively large home-range >1- 
500 km; 
Sessile/Low: Commons is sessile or can move small 
distances (within 1 km) 
Commons 
productivity 
How productive is the 
commons? 
Very productive: The unit or system produces at very 
high levels, and can withstand extensive human 
extraction and use, typical of modern large-scale 
industrial operations, for a period of time;  
Moderately Productive: The unit or system produces at 
moderate levels, and can withstand an equivalently 
moderate level of human extraction and use; 
Poorly productive: The unit or system produces at very 
low levels, and cannot withstand much human 
extraction and use beyond subsistence levels. 
Ecological 
resilience 
Given the current state 
of the system, how 
ecologically resilient is 
this commons to the 
threats that it can be 
expected to face?  
Highly resilient; 
Moderately resilient;  
Poorly resilient 
 
Resource 
market value 
If it is traded in a 
market, how high is the 
market value of this 
resource? 
High: Only very few actors have the purchasing power 
to purchase the commons (e.g., rare but highly 
desirable fish, e.g., bluefin tuna); 
Medium: Some actors have purchasing power to 
purchase the commons 
Low: Almost all actors have the purchasing power to 
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purchase the commons (e.g., a very common, small 
fish such as sardines) 
Distance to 
market  
What is the approximate 
distance between the 
boundaries of this 
governance system and 
the nearest market in 
which the commons 
within this system are 
sold? (Only if commons 
are sold). 
Definition: Calculate or 
estimate the shortest 
distance from the 
governance boundary to 
the nearest market for 
the resources contained 
within the system. Major 
market could be a 
trading centre, large 
town or provincial 
capital and even a local 
middleman, but does not 
refer to local subsistence 
use. 
Less than 10km;  
Between 10-100km;  
Between 100km-1000km;  
More than 1000km 
Thematic hypothesis 2 - Attributes of the MPA 
Variable Question (and 
definition) 
Options 
No take What percentage of the 
area of this protected 
area is covered by no 
take zones (IUCN Ia, Ib, 
and II)? 
Numerical 
Age What is the total age 
(years) of this 
governance system from 
Numerical 
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when it was originally 
designated to the end of 
this interaction? 
Snapshot age What is the total age 
(years) of this 
governance system from 
the start of the 
interaction being 
considered to the end? 
Numerical 
Size What is the total size 
(km2) of this protected 
area at the end of this 
snapshot? 
Numerical 
Efficient 
enforcement 
What is the extent of 
compliance to 
regulations that restrict 
fishing, both through 
overt policing and 
through community 
support for regulations? 
High: Appears to be well enforced, although 
clandestine poaching may occur; 
Medium: A moderate level of policing attempted, 
although infractions were apparent;  
Low: Little attempt at control, a ‘paper park’ 
Isolated Does the marine 
protected area protect an 
ecologically coherent 
area (i.e., limited or 
protected by deep water 
or sand) within no-take 
zones? 
High: MPA zone isolated from fishing areas by depth 
(.25m) or sand barriers of at least 20m width. (if an 
island is all no take then it is classed as high); 
Medium: A small (1–20%) percentage of zone 
boundary breached by continuous shallow reef habitat; 
Low: Shallow (.25m) reef habitat extends continuously 
across MPA boundary 
CAR 
principles 
Were the ecological 
principles of 
Comprehensive, 
Adequate, 
Representative 
considered in the design 
of this MPA? 
Yes: The CAR principles were fully considered in the 
design of the MPA and applied in practice, and the 
MPA is considered an appropriate size, shape and 
management level to ensure the ecological viability 
and integrity of the populations, species and 
communities, which have been selected as 
conservation features; 
Partially: Consideration was given to the CAR 
principles in the design of the MPA but their 
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application was compromised, either through size, 
shape (some features bisected), or insufficient 
management or protection; 
No: The CAR principles were not considered in the 
design of the MPA (i.e. little or no consideration was 
given to the size and/or shape of the sites, and/or entire 
features are not sufficiently protected); 
Thematic hypothesis 3 - social and governance attributes: the institutional design principles 
Variable Question (and 
definition) 
Options 
Actor group 
boundary 
clarity 
Are there clear rules 
that are followed 
about who and who 
isn't a member of 
this group? 
No boundaries: Entire lack of common understanding 
regarding group membership; 
Unclear boundaries: Some of the members of this group 
are aware of who is and who isn't a member, and there is 
some enforcement of any rules associated with 
membership; 
Clear boundaries: The great majority of the members of 
this group are aware of who is and who isn't a member, and 
there is strong enforcement of any rules associated with 
membership 
Actor group 
boundary 
fuzziness 
Is membership in 
this actor group 
subject to ongoing 
negotiations (fuzzy 
boundaries)? Or are 
the boundaries the 
group more rigid? 
Rigid: Changes in membership and the rights and 
obligations associated with membership change 
infrequently and are not changeable based on short to 
medium-term fluctuations; 
Fuzzy: Changes in membership and the rights and 
obligations associated with membership can change in a 
relatively ad hoc basis, based on the needs of users and 
potential members to access the benefits associated with 
membership 
Commons 
boundaries 
Are the boundaries 
that define the 
spatial extent of this 
commons clearly 
defined and highly 
visible? 
Very unclear boundaries: The boundaries of a commons are 
difficult to identify with precision. That is usually the case 
with the boundaries of migratory species and with many 
groundwater aquifer systems; 
Somewhat unclear boundaries: The boundaries of a 
commons are somewhat identifiable.  
Clear boundaries: The limits of the commons are 
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physically evident. This includes both natural elements and 
human-made artifacts that constrain the commons. Natural 
elements would include the biogeophysical limits of a 
watershed. Human-made artifacts would include fences that 
constrain a population of species. 
Commons 
boundary 
negotiability 
How negotiable is 
access by non-
members of this 
actor group to this 
environmental 
commons? 
Rigid: Negotiations to access this environmental commons 
by non-members are not possible or not fruitful; 
Moderate: Some negotiations can be made by non-
members;  
Negotiable: Ad-hoc negotiations can be and are commonly 
made by non-members to obtain access to this 
environmental common 
Outsider 
exclusion 
To what extent are 
members of this 
commons user 
group able to 
exclude non-
members (outsiders) 
from using this 
commons? 
No exclusion: Outsiders face no impediments from the user 
group in their attempts to use the commons; 
Some exclusion: Members of a commons using actor group 
somewhat effectively prevent non-members for using a 
commons that they use; 
Total exclusion: Users are able to prevent the great majority 
to all incursion by outsiders 
Social-
ecological fit 
To what extent 
(low, medium, or 
high) do the 
institutional 
arrangements of this 
governance system 
fit well with the 
ecological or 
physical features of 
the commons on 
which they are 
implemented? 
High: If achieve all three of the following,  
Medium: If achieve two of the following, 
Low: If achieve zero or one of the following: 
a. Does the governance system encompass the distribution 
or range of the resource (spatial fit) or do mechanisms exist 
to ensure their consistency across the range of this 
resource?  
b. Are the rules for the use of resources within the MPA 
consistent with the current scientific consensus?  
c. Does the governance system include rules or mechanisms 
to address threats to resources from other environmental 
commons (i.e. species or invasive species) social-ecological 
systems (i.e. land areas/runoff) and human activities (i.e. oil 
and mineral exploration affecting habitat)? (exclude climate 
change threats)     
Proportionality Is there general Yes: Costs and benefits are balanced in a way that is 
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(of costs and 
benefits) 
proportionality 
between the amount 
of costs group 
members incur and 
the amount of 
benefits received? 
expected and considered legitimate by members of the 
group 
No: Costs and benefits are unbalanced  
(Not about the size or profitability, or outcomes – just the 
proportional distribution within a user group) 
Participation 
in rule making 
How high is the 
level of 
participation of this 
actor group in the 
process that 
determines how this 
environmental 
commons is 
governed? 
High: Actors have active engagement in decision-making 
processes, including, but not limited to the ability to 
meaningfully make changes in important rules when 
appropriate; 
Medium: Actors have some engagement, e.g. the actor 
group may participate in electing representatives who have 
some say in rule changing, but the actor group itself does 
not participate; 
Low: Members of the actor group do not have any ability to 
participate in rule changing processes (although they may 
be informed of these processes, or have access to extreme 
ways of changing rules, such as, e.g. violent protests or acts 
of resistance of the type described by Scott (1985)) 
Self 
monitoring 
Does this actor 
group monitor its 
own activities with 
respect to the use of 
this commons? 
Yes: Members of this actor group monitor each others' 
behavior towards the commons; 
No: Members of this actor group do not monitor each 
others' behavior towards the commons 
Environmental 
monitoring 
How much 
environmental 
monitoring of this 
commons does this 
actor group engage 
in? 
High: This actor group engages in frequent and systematic 
monitoring efforts that are sufficient to adequately; observe 
changes in commons conditions; 
Moderate: This actor group engages in some monitoring of 
the conditions of this commons; 
Low: This actor group engages in very little to no 
monitoring of the conditions of this commons. 
Consequently, it cannot detect changes in commons 
conditions 
Self sanctions Are sanctions 
applied by and to 
the members of this 
Graduated sanctions; 
Non-graduated sanctions; 
No sanctions 
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group for violations 
of rules regarding 
extraction or 
emission? And if so, 
are these sanctions 
graduated 
(increasing with 
severity and 
repetition of 
offenses)? 
(Sanctions can include a diversity of forms of social 
shunning, fines, extra regulations or the complete 
prohibition of resource use or pollution emissions (Ostrom 
1990)) 
External 
recognition 
Within this 
governance system, 
do larger 
governmental 
jurisdictions (i.e. 
International 
agreements, Nation 
states) recognize the 
autonomy of lower-
level jurisdictions 
(States, regions, 
communities), and 
their right to make 
decisions regarding 
this commons? 
High: Complete recognition of larger governmental 
jurisdictions’ recognizing lower level jurisdictions’ 
autonomy in decision-making regarding the commons in 
question; 
Moderate: Some recognition; 
Low: No recognition 
 
 
Multiple levels Does this 
governance system 
contain multiple 
levels, with each 
level having a set of 
actors who conduct 
tasks with respect to 
the management of 
this commons? If 
so, is there active 
coordination across 
Single-level governance; 
Coordination among multiple levels; Multiple levels but no 
coordination 
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these levels, or not? 
Compliance Do members of this 
actor group follow 
the rules of this 
governance system 
with respect to the 
emission or 
appropriation of this 
commons? 
No: This actor group does not usually comply with the 
formal rules of a governance system that regulate the 
emission or appropriation of a given commons; 
Somewhat: This actor group sometimes complies with 
rules, or complies with only a subset of the rules;  
Yes: This actor group almost always or always complies 
with formal rules 
Conflict 
resolution 
Are mechanisms in 
place to address 
conflicts that arise 
over the use of this 
commons by this 
actor group? 
Yes: Conflict resolution mechanisms, whether formal and/or 
informal, exist; 
No: No conflict resolution mechanism exists 
Thematic hypothesis 4 – social attributes of the MPA: Participation 
Variable Question (and 
definition) 
Options 
Participation 
in rule making 
How high is the 
level of 
participation of 
this actor group 
in the process 
that determines 
how this 
environmental 
commons is 
governed? 
High: Actors have active engagement in decision-making 
processes, including, but not limited to the ability to 
meaningfully make changes in important rules when 
appropriate; 
Medium: Actors have some engagement, e.g. the actor group 
may participate in electing representatives who have some say in 
rule changing, but the actor group itself does not participate; 
Low: Members of the actor group do not have any ability to 
participate in rule changing processes (although they may be 
informed of these processes, or have access to extreme ways of 
changing rules, such as, e.g. violent protests or acts of resistance 
of the type described by Scott (1985)) 
Participation 
in protected 
area siting 
How high was 
the level of 
participation of 
this actor group 
or their 
representatives 
High: The actor group is in charge of the siting of the MPA with 
or without the support of the lead management agency; 
Medium: The lead management agency consults the actor group 
during the decision-making process; 
Low: The lead management agency informs the actor group of 
their decisions;  
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in siting of the 
marine 
protected area? 
None: The lead management agency does not seek input from 
the actor group 
Participation 
in protected 
area zoning 
How high was 
the level of 
participation of 
this actor group 
or their 
representatives 
in the (most 
recent) zoning 
of this marine 
protected area? 
High: The actor group is in charge of zoning of the MPA with or 
without the support of the lead management agency; 
Medium: The lead management agency consults the actor group 
during the decision-making process; 
Low: The lead management agency informs the actor group of 
their decisions;  
None: The lead management agency does not seek input from 
the actor group 
Participation 
in 
environmental 
monitoring 
How high is the 
level of 
participation of 
this actor group 
or their 
representatives 
in 
environmental 
monitoring? 
High: The actor group is in charge of the environmental 
monitoring of the commons with or without the support of the 
lead management agency; 
Medium: The lead management agency consults the actor group 
during the decision-making process; 
Low: The lead management agency informs the actor group of 
their decisions;  
None: The lead management agency does not seek input from 
the actor group 
Participation 
in social 
monitoring 
(enforcement) 
How high is the 
level of 
participation of 
this commons 
user group or 
their 
representatives 
in social 
monitoring 
(enforcement)? 
High: The actor group is in charge of social monitoring 
(enforcement) of the commons with or without the support of 
the lead management agency;  
Medium: The lead management agency consults the actor group 
during the decision-making process; 
Low: The lead management agency informs the actor group of 
their decisions;  
None: The lead management agency does not seek input from 
the actor group 
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S3. Summary of the key components coded for the fisheries and ecosystem health interactions 
for each large-scale MPA. To ensure consistency across cases, we focused on coding the most 
influential or impactful governance system, user group, and manager for each interaction at the scale 
of the MPA. Snapshot refers to a time period where management was fairly consistent (e.g., after 
legislative or policy reform).  
 
Case Fisheries-interaction Ecosystem health-interaction 
Central 
California 
National Marine 
Sanctuaries 
(USA) 
Governing org.: Fisheries managers Governing org.: Managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan Gov. system:  Management plan 
Snapshot: 1992-2015 Snapshot: 1992-2015 
User: Commercial fisher User: Researchers 
Commons: Groundfish habitat Commons: Rocky intertidal 
Cenderawasih 
Bay National 
Park (Indonesia) 
Governing org.: Co-managers Governing org.: Co-managers 
Gov. system:  System of Laws Gov. system:  System of Laws 
Snapshot: 2002-2015 Snapshot: 2002-2015 
User: Artisanal fisher User: Artisanal fisher 
Commons: Target reef fish Commons: Coral cover 
Galapagos 
Marine Reserve 
(Ecuador) 
Governing org.: Managers Governing org.: Managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan Gov. system:  Management plan 
Snapshot: 1998-2015 Snapshot: 1998-2015 
User: Artisanal fisher User: Tourism  
Commons: Sea cucumber Commons: Sharks 
Great Australian 
Bight Marine 
Park (Australia) 
Governing org.: Managers Governing org.: Managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan Gov. system:  Management plan 
Snapshot: 2000-2012 Snapshot: 2000-2012 
User: Commercial fisher User: Commercial fisher 
Commons: Southern bluefin tuna Commons: Australian sea lion 
Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park 
Governing org.: Co-managers Governing org.: Co-managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan Gov. system:  Management plan 
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(Australia) Snapshot: 2004-2015 Snapshot: 2004-2015 
User: Commercial fisher User: Recreational fisher 
Governing org Fisheries managers User:   
Commons: Target fish Commons: Coral cover 
Heard Island and 
McDonald 
Islands 
(Australia) 
Governing org.: Fisheries managers Governing org.: Managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan x2 Gov. system:  Management plan 
Snapshot: 2002-2012 Snapshot: 2002-2012 
User: Commerical fishers User:   
Commons: Toothfish Commons: King penguin 
Macquarie Island 
Marine Reserve 
(Australia) 
Governing org.: Fisheries managers Governing org.: Managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan x3 Gov. system:  Management plan 
x2 
Snapshot: 2001-2015 Snapshot: 2001-2015 
User: Commercial fishers User:   
Commons: Toothfish Commons: King penguin 
Papahānaumokuā
kea Marine 
National 
Monument 
(USA) 
Governing org.: Co-managers Governing org.: Co-managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan Gov. system:  Management plan 
Snapshot: 2006-2015 Snapshot: 2006-2015 
User:   User: Researchers 
Commons: Lobster Commons: Trophic density 
Raja Ampat MPA 
network 
(Indonesia) 
Governing org.: Co-managers Governing org.: Co-managers 
Gov. system:  System of Laws Gov. system:  System of Laws 
Snapshot: 2009-2015 Snapshot: 2009-2015 
User: Artisanal fisher User: Artisanal fisher 
Commons: Target reef fish Commons: Coral cover 
Seaflower MPA 
(Colombia) 
Governing org.: Manager Governing org.: Manager 
Gov. system:  System of Laws Gov. system:  System of Laws 
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Snapshot: 2005-2015 Snapshot: 2005-2015 
User: Artisanal fisher User: Artisanal fisher 
Commons: Groupers (6 species) Commons: Coral cover 
Svalbard Nature 
Reserves 
(Norway) 
Governing org.: Co-managers Governing org.: Co-managers 
Gov. system:  System of Laws Gov. system:  System of Laws 
Snapshot: 2002-2012 Snapshot: 2002-2012 
User: Commercial fishers User: Tourism 
Commons: Shrimp Commons: Polar bear 
Wakatobi 
National Park 
(Indonesia) 
Governing org.: Co-managers Governing org.: Co-managers 
Gov. system:  Management plan Gov. system:  Management plan 
Snapshot: 2008-2015 Snapshot: 2008-2015 
User: Artisanal fisher User: Artisanal fisher 
Commons: Fish spawning Commons: Coral cover 
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S4. The total variation (%) explained by the first two dimensions from the analyses (PCA/MCA) 
for each thematic hypothesis and corresponding outcome. (N.B. each outcome and hypothesis 
corresponds to a separate unit of analysis). 
Thematic hypothesis Fisheries 
trend 
Fisheries-
associated 
wellbeing 
Ecosystem 
health trend 
Test 
used 
1: Ecological and economic attributes 
of species and ecosystems 
50.12 53.19 58.72 MCA 
2: Attributes of the MPA  67.22 59.54 49.31 PCA 
3: Social and governance attributes: 
the institutional design principles  
54.10 56.12 49.31 MCA 
4: Social and governance attributes: 
participation 
74.51 79.74 74.7 MCA 
 
S5. The categorical variables in thematic hypothesis 1 – ecological and economic attributes of 
species or ecosystem (productivity, market value, distance to market) that significantly 
contribute to the first dimension in the MCA for the fisheries trend data. The outcome variable 
(fisheries trend) was also correlated to the first dimension indicating a strong correlation. 
Ecological resilience and mobility did not contribute to the formation of the first dimension.     
(R2 and p-values are calculated using ANOVA in the dimdesc function in FactoMineR).  
 R2 p-value 
Productivity 0.92 <0.01  
Fisheries trend (outcome) 0.75 <0.01  
Market value 0.75 <0.01  
Distance to market 0.68 <0.05  
 
S6. 2D visual representation of the relationship between the fisheries trend outcome (improved, 
same, worse), and the variables in thematic hypothesis 1 – ecological and economic attributes of 
the species or system (productivity, mobility, ecological resilience, market value, distance to 
market). Variable categories that were significant correlated to the trend are coloured based on their 
correlation. Variable categories that were non-significant are in grey. The plot is based on the MCA 
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output with 95% confidence ellipses are for the fisheries trend categories, with the larger symbol 
noting the centre of the ellipse.   
 
S7 Supplementary Results: 
This section details the full descriptions of the dimensions from all analyses (MCA/PCA for each 
thematic hypothesis, interaction, and outcome), including instances where no association between the 
outcome and dimensions was found. Results are ordered by the four thematic hypotheses, and are 
presented by outcome for: fisheries trend, fisheries associated wellbeing, and ecosystem health trend. 
Results focus on the first two dimensions from the MCA or PCA and the total amount of variation 
explained by the first two dimensions is shown in brackets for each hypothesis and outcome. The 
description of the dimensions first shows the variables that are linked to the dimensions, followed by 
the variable categories that are linked to the dimensions. Where an outcome was found to be 
significantly correlated with a dimension it has been highlighted in bold. 
The dimension description is the output from the dimdesc function (from the FactoMineR package: Lê 
et al. 2008), which identifies the most correlated variables with a given dimension (Husson et al. 
2010). Only significant variables are shown (p<0.10).  
Thematic hypothesis 1- Ecological and economic attributes of the species or ecosystem 
1.1 Fisheries – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 50%):  
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
                   R2     p.value 
productivity      0.92  <0.001 
trend              0.75  0.004 
market value       0.75  0.004 
distance to market 0.68  0.036 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                       Estimate   p.value 
productivity_low   0.8  <0.001 
market value_high        0.87  0.001 
fishery trend worse      0.90  0.001 
market distance >1000km  1.03  0.016 
mobility_high      1.01  0.082 
fishery trend improved   -0.62  0.082 
market value_med         -0.60  0.040 
productivity_med  -0.82  <0.001 
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Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                   R2    p.value 
Distance to market 0.78  0.010 
mobility         0.62  0.021 
fishery trend      0.62  0.022 
market value       0.55  0.041 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                 Estimate     p.value 
Market distance <10km      0.70  0.039 
mobility_low      0.32  0.045 
Market distance 10-100km  -0.76  0.010 
value_low            -0.73  0.009 
fishery trend same        -0.71  0.006 
mobility_med    -0.73  0.004 
 
 
1.2 Fisheries – social wellbeing (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 53%): 
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
                   R2      p.value 
productivity       0.87  <0.001 
market value       0.75  0.007 
distance to market 0.63  0.092 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                      Estimate      p.value 
productivity_low    0.78  <0.001 
market value_high         0.86   0.003 
Market distance >1000km   0.93   0.045 
mobility_high       1.02   0.088 
Market distance <10 -0.71   0.087 
Wellbeing trend worse -0.67   0.037 
Market value_med         -0.69  0.035 
productivity_med  -0.78  <0.001 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                    R2     p.value 
Distance to market  0.88  0.004 
Market value        0.62  0.035 
mobility            0.61  0.038 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                 Estimate     p.value 
Wellbeing trend worse  0.52 0.069 
mobility_low     0.28 0.085 
less10          0.72 0.091 
Wellbeing trend same  -0.48 0.098 
Market value_low  -0.79 0.009 
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mobility_med   -0.77 0.008 
market distance 10-100 -1.01 0.004 
 
1.3 Ecosystem health – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 59%):  
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables 
                   R2      p.value 
productivity       0.92  <0.001 
mobility           0.84  <0.001 
distance to market 0.85   0.001 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                   Estimate      p.value 
productivity_med   0.85   0.003 
mobility_high      0.60   0.010 
more1000           1.16   0.017 
10to100           -1.06   0.013 
mobility_low      -0.98  <0.001 
productivity_high -1.00  <0.001 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables 
                   R2    p.value 
productivity       0.62 0.013 
distance to market 0.63 0.039 
resilience         0.29 0.069 
mobility           0.44 0.076 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                   Estimate     p.value 
productivity_low  0.86  0.004 
mobility_med      0.83  0.019 
100to1000         0.79  0.020 
Resilience_poor   0.40  0.069 
Resilience_mod   -0.40  0.069 
more1000         -0.84  0.031 
 
Thematic hypothesis 2 - Attributes of the MPA: 
2.1 Fisheries – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 67%):  
Description of the First Dimension by the quantitative variables  
         correlation      p.value 
Notake     0.92   <0.001 
Isolated   0.83    0.001 
CAR        0.79    0.002 
Size       0.64    0.026 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the quantitative variables  
             correlation     p.value 
Age            0.76  0.004 
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Snapshot_age   0.71  0.010 
enforcement    0.51  0.090 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the variable categories for the fisheries trend outcome (categ
orical): (fishery trend) and the categories of this categorical variable 
                Estimate     p.value 
Fishery trend improved  1.55  0.002 
Fishery trend same     -1.29  0.016 
 
2.2 Fisheries – social wellbeing (total variation explained by first two dimensions:60%): 
Description of the First Dimension by the quantitative variables  
         correlation      p.value 
Notake     0.90   <0.001 
Isolated   0.81    0.004 
CAR        0.81   0.004 
Age       -0.57   0.085 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the quantitative variables  
             correlation    p.value 
Age            0.71  0.021 
Size           0.71  0.022 
Snapshot_age   0.65  0.041 
 
2.3 Ecosystem health – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 49%): 
Description of the First Dimension by the quantitative variables 
         correlation      p.value 
Notake     0.92   <0.001 
Isolated   0.83   0.001 
CAR        0.79   0.002 
Size       0.64   0.026 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the quantitative variables 
             correlation     p.value 
Age            0.76  0.004 
Snapshot_age   0.72  0.009 
enforcement    0.51  0.090 
 
Thematic hypothesis 3 - social and governance attributes: the institutional design principles: 
3.1 Fisheries – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 54%) 
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
                          R2     p.value 
Compliance          0.65  0.003 
Outsider exclusion  0.77  0.003 
selfmonitoring         0.64  0.003 
self_sanctions      0.64  0.003 
participation       0.67  0.011 
external recognition 0.51  0.057 
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multi_levels        0.33  0.064 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                             Estimate     p.value 
Compliance_high                0.52   0.003 
self_sanctions_Graduated          0.67   0.003 
selfmonitoring_Yes                0.67   0.003 
outsider_exclusion_some        0.77   0.003 
participation_high             0.72   0.020 
single level                   0.64   0.064 
commons boundary negotiability_rigid  0.62  0.072 
coordinated levels                   -0.64  0.064 
external recognition_low             -0.68  0.022 
participation_low             -0.71   0.022 
outsider_exclusion_no        -0.69   0.005 
self_sanctions_No               -0.67   0.003 
selfmonitoring_No              -0.67   0.003 
Compliance_some              -0.52  0.003 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                   R2      p.value 
External recognition 0.93  <0.001 
Fishery trend         0.73   0.005 
Environmental monitoring  0.44   0.026 
outsider_exclusion  0.60   0.026 
self-monitoring          0.34   0.059 
self-sanctions      0.34   0.059 
participation       0.45   0.091 
costs.benefits           0.28   0.093 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                         Estimate      p.value 
External recognition_high    0.54  0.015 
fishery trend same            0.52  0.018 
environmental monitoring_low 0.39  0.026 
self_sanctions_Graduated        0.44  0.059 
selfmonitoring_Yes            0.44  0.059 
outsider_exclusion_some    0.73  0.059 
costs.benefits_No               0.32  0.093 
costs.benefits_Yes             -0.32  0.093 
Social-ecological_fit_med      -0.50  0.083 
self_sanctions_No          -0.44  0.059 
selfmonitoring_No            -0.44   0.059 
outsider_exclusion_total   -0.76  0.040 
envir_monitor_med          -0.39  0.026 
participation_med          -0.52  0.024 
fishery trend worse            -0.63  0.003 
external recognition_mod          -0.73  0.000 
 
3.2 Fisheries – social wellbeing (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 56%) 
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
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                    R2      p.value 
Compliance          0.77  0.001 
costs.benefits           0.66  0.004 
participation       0.64  0.029 
Social-ecological fit    0.61  0.038 
External recognition  0.60  0.040 
outsider_exclusion  0.56  0.059 
environmental monitoring 0.34  0.079 
 
Description of the First Dimension by categories  
                          Estimate      p.value 
Compliance_high                0.60   0.001 
costs.benefits_Yes                  0.57   0.004 
Social-ecological fit_med             0.76  0.009 
commons_boundary negotiability_rigid  0.69  0.065 
wellbeing improved                    0.63   0.073 
external recognition_mod              0.47  0.079 
environmental monitoring_med          0.40  0.079 
environmental monitoring_low        -0.40   0.079 
Social-ecological fit_low           -0.27   0.078 
Wellbeing worse                     -0.58   0.077 
outsider_exclusion_no        -0.78   0.020 
external recognition_low            -0.75   0.009 
participation_low            -0.83   0.009 
costs.benefits_No                   -0.57   0.004 
Compliance_some                     -0.60   0.001 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                      R2      p.value 
External recogntion   0.95  <0.001 
Self-monitoring         0.54   0.016 
self_sanctions      0.54   0.016 
outsider_exclusion  0.66   0.022 
environmental monitoring  0.49   0.024 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                              Estimate      p.value 
External recogntion_high      0.94  <0.001 
self_sanctions_Graduated    0.76   0.016 
selfmonitoring_Yes             0.76   0.016 
outsider_exclusion_some     1.12   0.016 
environmental_monitoring_low    0.44   0.024 
external_recognition_mod        -0.66   0.024 
environmental_monitoring_med     -0.44   0.024 
self_sanctions_No          -0.76   0.016 
selfmonitoring_No            -0.76   0.016 
 
3.3 Ecosystem health – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 49%): 
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
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                           R2     p.value 
Social-ecological fit             0.82  0.003 
costs.benefits            0.57  0.012 
user boundaries           0.51  0.020 
environmental monitoring  0.67  0.021 
participation        0.65  0.024 
Compliance           0.41  0.047 
Commons boundary negotiability 0.56  0.056 
user boundary fuzziness           0.37  0.061 
Ecosystem health trend       0.52  0.077 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                           Estimate     p.value 
Environmental monitoring_high 0.92  0.005 
Social-ecological fit_high     0.83  0.005 
costs.benefits_Yes            0.51  0.012 
participation_med         0.66  0.013 
commons_bound_nego_mod    1.06  0.020 
user_boundaries_unclear       0.75  0.020 
ecos health trend improved    0.98  0.020 
Compliance_high           0.50  0.047 
user_boundary fuzziness_fuzzy  0.48  0.061 
user_ boundary fuzziness_rigid   -0.48  0.061 
Compliance_med           -0.50  0.047 
participation_low        -0.61  0.047 
Social-ecological fit_low        -0.71  0.022 
user_boundaries_clear        -0.75  0.020 
costs.benefits_No            -0.51  0.012 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                     R2      p.value 
participation   0.93  <0.001 
self-monitoring   0.76  <0.001 
Compliance      0.45  0.033 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                               Estimate      p.value 
selfmonitoring_No              0.55  0.001 
Compliance_med              0.48  0.033 
participation_low           0.72  0.033 
external recognition_low              0.54  0.043 
Social-ecological fit_med                -0.45  0.084 
commons_boundary negotiability_rigid -0.48  0.080 
Compliance_high             -0.48  0.033 
selfmonitoring_Yes            -0.55  0.001 
participation_high          -0.82  0.001 
 
Thematic hypothesis 4 – social attributes of the MPA: Participation: 
4.1 Fisheries – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 75%): 
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Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
                   R2      p.value 
MPA zoning             0.98  <0.001 
MPA siting             0.96  <0.001 
social_monitoring  0.96  <0.001 
rule_making        0.71   0.007 
environmental monitoring  0.71   0.007 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                       Estimate      p.value 
MPA zoning_high           1.60  <0.001 
MPA siting_high           1.58  <0.001 
rule_making_high          1.18   0.001 
enviro_monitoring_high    1.16   0.001 
social_monitoring_medium  0.79   0.028 
social_monitoring_high    0.79   0.028 
fishery trend same        0.69   0.087 
social_monitoring_low    -1.57  <0.001 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                  R2      p.value 
rule_making       0.92  <0.001 
MPA zoning        0.91  <0.001 
enviro_monitoring 0.66   0.013 
MPA siting        0.64   1.766 
fishery trend     0.59  0.029 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                       Estimate      p.value 
MPA zoning_low            0.93  <0.001 
rule_making_low           0.99   <0.001 
enviro_monitoring_low     0.75   0.013 
MPA siting_low            0.62   0.021 
fishery trend same        0.63   0.044  
enviro_monitoring_medium -0.76   0.011 
fishery trend worse      -0.77   0.011 
MPA siting_medium        -0.78   0.006 
rule_making_medium       -0.85   0.003 
MPA zoning_medium        -0.84   0.001 
 
4.2 Fisheries – social wellbeing (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 80%): 
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
                         R2      p.value 
social_monitoring 0.94  <0.001 
MPA zoning        0.97  <0.001 
MPA siting        0.95  <0.001 
rule_making       0.59   0.044 
enviro_monitoring 0.59   0.045 
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Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                       Estimate      p.value 
MPA zoning_high         1.98  <0.001 
social_monitoring_high  1.46  <0.001 
MPA siting_high         1.94  <0.001 
rule_making_high        1.16   0.011 
enviro_monitoring_high  1.13   0.012 
wellbeing improved      0.97   0.045 
social_monitoring_low  -1.46  <0.001 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                         R2      p.value 
rule_making       0.92  <0.001 
MPA zoning        0.91  <0.001 
enviro_monitoring 0.66   0.024 
MPA siting        0.64   0.028 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                           Estimate      p.value 
MPA zoning_low            0.83  <0.001 
rule_making_low           0.94  <0.001 
enviro_monitoring_low     0.71   0.016 
MPA siting_low            0.54   0.022 
enviro_monitoring_medium -0.73   0.013 
MPA siting_medium        -0.79   0.006 
rule_making_medium       -0.81   0.003 
MPA zoning_medium        -0.85  <0.001 
 
4.3 Ecosystem health – trend (total variation explained by first two dimensions: 75%): 
Description of the First Dimension by the categorical variables  
                         R2      p.value 
MPA zoning        0.93  <0.001 
social_monitoring 0.82   0.001 
rule_making       0.85   0.003 
MPA siting        0.84   0.004 
enviro_monitoring 0.72   0.022 
 
Description of the First Dimension by variable categories 
                           Estimate      p.value 
MPA zoning_high           1.36  0.001 
MPA siting_high           1.28  0.001 
rule_making_high          1.21  0.001 
social_monitoring_medium  0.87  0.001 
enviro_monitoring_high    0.91  0.014 
MPA zoning_low           -1.02  0.062 
MPA siting_low           -0.80  0.055 
enviro_monitoring_low    -0.86  0.019 
social_monitoring_low    -0.87  0.001 
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Description of the Second Dimension by the categorical variables  
                   R2     p.value 
MPA zoning       0.80  0.008 
MPA siting       0.70  0.027 
rule_making  0.58  0.074 
 
Description of the Second Dimension by variable categories 
                           Estimate     p.value 
MPA zoning_low            0.55  0.049 
eco. health trend same    0.72  0.062 
rule_making_low           0.70  0.063 
enviro_monitoring_medium -0.68  0.081 
rule_making_medium       -0.69  0.049 
MPA siting_medium        -0.97  0.005 
MPA zoning_medium        -0.83   0.002 
 
 
 
 
